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Abstract
Election violence is common in many developing countries and has potentially detrimental impli-
cations for democratic consolidation. Drawing on political psychology, we argue that citizens’ fear
of campaign violence undermines support for democracy while increasing support for autocracy.
Using individual-level survey data from 21 electoral democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa, we find
robust support for our argument. Citizens fearing campaign violence are less likely to support
democracy and multi-party competition, more likely to favor a return to autocracy, and less likely
to turn out to vote. Our findings have important implications for democratic survival and provide
further impetus for reducing electoral violence.
Keywords
African politics, democratic consolidation, democratic institutions, electoral violence
Introduction
With the end of the Cold War, autocratic regimes gave way to multiparty elections across
the world, including many Sub-Saharan African countries. Yet few of these political open-
ings led to liberal democracy, and concerns about democratic backsliding have intensified in
recent years.1 While virtually all countries hold elections today, their quality and integrity
vary widely. Election-related violence accompanies about a quarter of national elections
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worldwide (Birch and Muchlinski, 2017; Hafner-Burton et al., 2014). For example, in Africa
between 1990 and 2008, generalized killing and repressive violence directly linked to elec-
tions occurred in 20% of national elections, with an additional 38% of national elections
experiencing violent harassment (Straus and Taylor, 2012: 23). Similarly, approximately half
of African citizens fear election violence, and about 16% of people fear election violence a
lot.2 Yet although fear of election violence is common in many developing countries, we still
know surprisingly little about its effects on attitudes and behavior.3
What are the consequences of fearing election violence for citizens’ political attitudes and
participation? In particular, do these fears influence public support for democracy and auto-
cracy?4 Most of the existing literature has focused on consequences for turnout or turnout
intention. While the majority of studies find negative effects of violence on turnout
(Bratton, 2008; Collier and Vicente, 2014; Condra et al., 2018; Gutierrez-Romero and
LeBas, 2020; Ley, 2018), others find positive effects (Burchard, 2015: 14; Travaglianti, 2014:
chapter 6), or no relationship (Bekoe and Burchard, 2017; Burchard, 2020; Travaglianti,
2014: chapter 7). Studies on other attitudes are sparse, but generally establish negative
effects, concluding that violence can reduce support for democracy (Burchard, 2015), politi-
cal knowledge (Söderström, 2018), dissent (Young, 2020), as well as trust and social capital
(Dercon and Gutierrez-Romero, 2012; Höglund and Piyarathne, 2009).
Building on research on emotions in political psychology, we argue that fearing election
violence is detrimental to democratic survival, contributes to increased support for auto-
cracy, and reduces turnout. Fear of campaign violence increases risk perceptions and risk
aversion, leading people to reconsider the value of democracy, alternative forms of govern-
ment, and democratic participation. While campaign violence harms some citizens directly,
it has much broader psychological effects by instilling fear in citizens and creating a climate
of insecurity and distrust. We argue that citizens fearful of violence become risk averse and
less supportive of electoral competition and democracy, viewing elections as risky endeavors
ripe with intimidation, threats, and the use of force. When democratic competition triggers
conflict rather than serving as a peaceful means of selecting leaders, public support for it in
the citizenry decreases. In addition to lower support for democracy, people fearing violence
become more willing to return to previous autocratic regimes, i.e. regimes without
competitive elections, where such conflict triggers are absent. Fearing election violence thus
lowers citizens’ opinions about the value of competition as well as their appreciation for
democracy relative to non-competitive forms of government.
Using individual-level survey data from three Afrobarometer rounds covering 21 electoral
democracies in Africa, our analysis focuses on within-country comparisons of individuals
who differ in fear of campaign violence, but are similar with regard to a number of potential
socio-economic and political confounders. We document that fearing election violence is sig-
nificantly associated with lower public support for democracy and elections, higher support
for returning to the previous autocratic regime, and lower turnout. First, we find robust and
consistent evidence showing that fearing campaign violence reduces citizens’ satisfaction
with democracy. Exploring which institutional features of democracy are affected, we find
that the negative attitudinal effect is not just limited to the competition features of democ-
racy. Second, fearing election violence is significantly associated with a boost in citizens’ pre-
ference for autocratic forms of government, such as single-party, personalist, and military
rule. However, we do not find any differential effects of fear across age groups. Finally, we
establish that those fearing violence are less likely to turn out to vote. Overall, our analyses
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support the argument that election violence reduces support for democracy and generates
growing support for a return to autocracy.
We advance prior research in three ways. First, we make theoretical and empirical contri-
butions to work on election violence and political violence. Grounding our argument in psy-
chology and neuroscience research on emotions, we focus on fear of pre-election violence as
one plausible channel through which violence reduces support for democratic attitudes and
behavior. We center our argument on fear of violence rather than direct exposure because
violence could affect attitudes through a variety of instrumental or emotional responses with
divergent effects on support for democracy and turnout. Experience with violence can make
citizens fearful and lead them to withdraw from the democratic process, as we argue here,
yet some individuals might respond to violence with anger or indignation, which could lead
them to become more—and not less—involved in politics (Costalli and Ruggeri, 2015).5
Conflating the range of possible responses to violence is one plausible reason why the litera-
ture on the consequences of violence has produced mixed findings.6 Methodologically, we
advance prior work with a better empirical strategy and greater geographic scope. Other sta-
tistical analyses rely on aggregate data (Bekoe and Burchard, 2017; Hafner-Burton et al.,
2018), single countries (Bratton, 2008; Condra et al., 2018; Gutierrez-Romero, 2014;
Gutierrez-Romero and LeBas, 2020; Travaglianti, 2014), or bivariate correlations in a global
sample (Norris, 2014: 129). Only a few studies have examined the individual-level effects of
election violence for several African countries (Burchard, 2015, 2020; Söderström, 2018),
but these remain limited to analyzing a single round of Afrobarometer data and focus on a
more limited set of outcomes. We analyze a range of countries in one region (Africa) and
focus on average individual-level effects within countries by employing country and survey-
round fixed effects, while controlling for a broad set of potential confounders. We replicate
results by comparing individuals in the same sub-national districts with district fixed effects.
Finally, we establish the robustness of our results through placebo regressions, sensitivity
analyses, matching, and a validation exercise demonstrating that exposure to campaign vio-
lence correlates with greater fear of campaign violence. While our research design is observa-
tional and does not permit us to make claims about causality, a key benefit is considerable
external validity, and robustness tests address many potential threats to inference.7
Second, we contribute to the literature on democratic breakdown and autocratization. If
election violence impairs democratization, then the existing literature on democratization
and consolidation has an important blindspot. We argue that fear of violence increases peo-
ple’s risk perceptions and reduces their support for democracy, and present evidence consis-
tent with these expectations. We also provide novel insights into the effect of fear of violence
on support for autocracy, which has not been examined in prior work. We find that citizens
fearful of violence not only become less supportive of democracy, but also increase their sup-
port of autocratic forms of government, which is critical for gauging the potential conse-
quences of violence for democratic breakdown. Research on democratic breakdown has
long noted that low democratic satisfaction reduces the public’s willingness to defend democ-
racy against power-grabbing politicians, suggesting that public attitudes about democracy
are important for democratic survival and democratization (Norris, 2011: 231–235; Svolik,
2013). We show that fear of campaign violence reduces public support for democracy and
makes a return to autocracy more appealing. These findings are especially important in light
of growing global concerns about democratic backsliding.
Third, we contribute to research on electoral competition and the question of whether
competition is good or bad for democracy. Elections can provide peaceful conflict resolution
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(Fearon, 2011; Przeworski, 1991) but can also lead to democratic breakdown if competing
parties have similar popular support (Chacon et al., 2011) or if contenders challenge election
results (Przeworski, 2005). We contribute to this literature by examining one aspect of elec-
toral competition—fear of campaign violence. Our analyses suggest that fearing campaign
violence is bad for democracy because it lowers support for democracy and some of its fea-
tures, such as multi-party competition or the rule of law.
Argument
We argue that fearing campaign violence has substantial and detrimental consequences: it
reduces attitudinal and behavioral support for democracy and boosts support for autocracy.
Our emotion-based argument draws on insights from psychology and neuroscience in linking
fear to attitudes and political behavior. Rather than focusing on how direct exposure to vio-
lence affects outcomes, which could lead to a variety of psychological responses, we center
our argument on fear as one plausible and common emotional response. Prior work has
shown that exposure to political violence heightens fear (Chipman et al., 2011; Young, 2019),
but can also lead to a range of other emotional responses, including anger (Zeitzoff, 2014),
shame (Barber et al., 2016), and exclusionary attitudes (Canetti-Nisim et al., 2009).
Emotions are chemical and neural responses to deal with specific events (Damasio, 1994;
Frijda, 1994). According to cognitive appraisal theory (Lazarus, 1991), which posits that
emotions are determined by cognitive appraisals of the state of the world in relation to an
individual’s goals, fear is an emotion that is common in situations characterized by low cer-
tainty, low pleasantness, low control, and high anticipated effort (Lerner and Keltner, 2000).
Faced with such a situation, fear is often (but not exclusively) an instrumental response,
enabling an individual to manage a threat (Petersen, 2002: 19–20).8 Theory in psychology
highlights how emotions such as fear affect attitudes and behavior. Lerner and Keltner’s
(2000, 2001) appraisal tendency theory argues that emotions are not only induced by cogni-
tive appraisals, but that an individual’s emotional state also influences his or her perception
of other information to reinforce an appropriate response. In other words, fear, as an emo-
tional response to violence, affects an individual’s attitudes, views, and behavior.
Consistent with this body of theory, research on emotion-guided reasoning (Marcus et al.,
2000) has shown that some emotions—in particular, fear—can make individuals change pre-
viously held beliefs and behavior. When feeling threatened, people stop relying on habitual
evaluations. Dangers and threats motivate people to re-assess their attitudes, which can lead
them to alter their judgment about issues, events, and institutions. In particular, there is con-
siderable empirical evidence in psychology, economics, and political science that fear influ-
ences risk perceptions and risk aversion. Experimental evidence shows that fear increases
perceptions of risks (Johnson and Tversky, 1983; Lerner and Keltner, 2000; Lerner et al.,
2003; Young, 2019) and risk aversion (Cohen et al., 2015; Gusio et al., 2018; Young, 2019).
Hence, fear of violence as one particular type of fear may affect people’s attitudes and beha-
vior through its implications for risk perceptions and risk aversion. We discuss below how
such fears have detrimental effects on attitudes toward democracy, autocracy, and political
behavior.
We begin by discussing how fear of pre-electoral violence affects attitudes. Campaign vio-
lence, i.e. the use of violence prior to election day, is generally used to shape turnout and vote
choice and thus election outcomes (Straus and Taylor, 2012: 20; Wilkinson and Haid, 2009).
4 Conflict Management and Peace Science 00(0)
While such violence may physically prevent some people from voting, violence is effective
primarily through its psychological effects on a much larger set of citizens, particularly
through instilling fear and creating a general climate of intimidation and distrust (Bratton,
2008; Höglund and Piyarathne, 2009). Hence, in elections with intimidation, threats, and the
use of force, people become fearful of democratic processes rather than viewing them as a
peaceful means of selecting representatives. Citizens afraid of violence should therefore
express lower support for elections and democracy. In addition to re-evaluating the value of
democracy, those fearing violence may view democratic governance as risky precisely
because it failed to protect them from such violence (Höglund and Piyarathne, 2009: 299–
300). In consequence, we expect that fear of election violence reduces citizens’ attitudinal
support for democracy as a form of government.
Hypothesis 1. Fearing election violence reduces citizens’ pro-democratic attitudes.
Beyond reducing citizens’ support for democracy, does fear of electoral violence also
affect citizens’ attitudes toward autocracy? We argue that fear of campaign violence also
strengthens support for autocracy, an important—perhaps the most important—implication
that to date has not been examined. Citizens who fear intimidation, harassment, and violence
in elections may reasonably prefer political systems they view as potentially less risky, such
as non-competitive regimes or those with no elections at all. People afraid of campaign vio-
lence will perceive the holding of regular competitive elections as riskier and the chances of
the incumbent party—generally the perpetrator of violence in the Sub-Saharan African con-
text9—leaving office peacefully as lower (Aldama et al., 2019), so that autocratic government
forms without competitive elections (e.g. one-party, personalist, or military rule) become rel-
atively more attractive.10 Rather than comparing their current regime with abstract notions
of autocracy, we expect that citizens compare their democratic experience with previous
autocratic regimes in their own country. Since most electoral democracies in Sub-Saharan
Africa have transitioned in the early 1990s, citizens are either able to draw on their own
memories and lived experiences or on what is transmitted through education or public mem-
ories. We therefore expect that fearful individuals become more supportive of their country’s
past autocratic form of government, compared to individuals not fearing election violence.11
Hypothesis 2. Fearing election violence increases citizens’ support for their country’s past
autocratic form of government.
In addition to attitudes, we examine how fear affects political behavior, in particular elec-
toral turnout. If fear of electoral violence increases an individual’s risk perception of voting,
then they might for instrumental reasons disengage from electoral politics and any election-
related activities, including polling (Valentino et al., 2011). Similarly, if fear affects risk per-
ceptions and incumbents are generally the main perpetrators, it should influence citizens’
beliefs of how likely it is that the incumbent regime will accept electoral defeat (Aldama
et al., 2019: 108–110). The less likely a citizen thinks it is that the incumbent party will be
defeated and resign, the less reason she has to engage in the risky activity of voting, espe-
cially if she supports the opposition. Moreover, fear might also influence citizens’ beliefs
about how likely it is that other citizens will turn out to vote (Aldama et al., 2019: 110–114;
Höglund and Piyarathne, 2009: 299). Given that in the Sub-Saharan African context
von Borzyskowski et al. 5
incumbents are the main perpetrators and turnout under the secret ballot is more easily
observed than vote choice, opposition supporters and non-partisans should be least likely to
vote, especially if others are also expected to abstain, which increases their risk of standing
out at the poll.
Finally, Aldama et al. (2019: 114–118) show that if fear increases risk aversion, then the
effects on participation in risky actions are ambiguous. In general, the effect of fear is to
reduce voter mobilization through increased pessimism and greater risk perception; however,
in rare cases, in particular when the regime is unpopular and citizens think they have little to
lose, fear can actually have a mobilizing effect through a so-called ‘‘nothing-to-lose-effect.’’
Overall, theory suggests a negative effect, but there are specific circumstances in which an
increase in fear can result in mobilization against perpetrators.
The empirical literature on election violence on turnout largely supports this theoretical
prediction: the majority of empirical studies point toward electoral violence reducing turnout
(e.g. Birch, 2010; Bratton, 2008: 626; Condra et al., 2018; Höglund and Piyarathne, 2009:
299; Klopp and Kamungi, 2008: 15), and only a few studies find null or turnout-increasing
effects (e.g. Bekoe and Burchard, 2017; Burchard, 2015, 2020; Hafner-Burton et al., 2014;
LeBas, 2006; Travaglianti, 2014). Hence, although there is the potential for a backlash effect
in very specific circumstances, we expect that fear of campaign violence reduces a citizen’s
willingness to vote, leading to our third and final hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3. Fearing election violence reduces citizens’ electoral turnout.
Research design
We assess our hypotheses empirically using survey data from Sub-Saharan African countries,
many of which regularly experience violence during elections.
Data and measurements
All variables come from waves 4–6 of the Afrobarometer survey.12 These nationally
standardized questionnaires measure a host of characteristics among a random sample of
between 1200 and 2400 individuals per country. Surveys were conducted in 2008–2009
(round 4), 2011–2013 (round 5), and 2014–2015 (round 6). The questionnaires survey individ-
uals’ fear of campaign violence, attitudes toward democracy, autocratic governments, and
various institutional elements of democracy, whether a respondent voted in the last election,
and a large battery of socio-economic and political control variables.13 The Afrobarometer
surveys offer the longest time series on the key variables of interest across a broad set of
countries, providing the ideal testing ground for our hypotheses.
We limit our sample to electoral democracies to ensure that survey measurements for our
main outcomes (e.g. satisfaction with or the extent of democracy) are reasonable. It is not
meaningful to interpret survey questions about satisfaction with democracy for citizens living
in autocracies. Thus our sample consists of the 21 out of the 38 African countries covered by
survey waves 4–6 which Freedom House classified as electoral democracies at the time of the
survey.14 Electoral democracies are countries that have: (a) a competitive, multiparty politi-
cal system; (b) universal adult suffrage for all citizens; (c) regularly contested elections con-
ducted in conditions of ballot secrecy, reasonable ballot security, and the absence of massive
voter fraud, and that yield results that are representative of the public will; and (d) significant
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public access of major political parties to the electorate through the media and through gen-
erally open political campaigning (Freedom House, 2008).15
Explanatory variable. Our key explanatory variable Fear of Campaign Violence is based on the
following survey question: ‘‘During election campaigns in this country, how much do you
personally fear becoming a victim of political intimidation or violence?’’ Responses are ord-
inally scaled and range from ‘‘not at all’’ (0) to ‘‘a lot’’ (3). This means that all analyses are
limited to fearing pre-electoral (as opposed to election day or post-electoral) violence.
Among the regional barometers, Afrobarometer is the only one that consistently asks how
much respondents fear campaign violence across survey waves.16
Outcome variables. We consider two categories of outcomes: measures of attitudinal and (self-
reported) behavioral support for democracy as well as indicators of support for the past
autocratic form of government. Attitudinal support for democracy is measured in four ways.
First, we measure whether a respondent Prefers Democracy to all other forms of govern-
ment. The measure is coded dichotomously, where a value of 1 indicates that a respondent
prefers democracy over all other forms of government and 0 otherwise. The second measure
records an individual’s self-assessment of the country’s current Extent of Democracy. This is
a four-point index ranging from 1 (i.e. undemocratic) to 4 (i.e. fully democratic). Our third
attitudinal measure is Satisfaction with Democracy. Responses are measured ordinally on a
five-point index ranging from 0 (i.e. my country is not a democracy) to 4 (i.e. very satisfied).
Our final attitudinal measure, Trust in Political Institutions, combines how much respon-
dents trust the president with how much they trust parliament into a seven-point index, rang-
ing from 0 (i.e. trust not at all) to 6 (i.e. trust a lot). Our behavioral measure of support for
democracy is based on self-reported Turnout in the most recent national election, where a
value of 1 indicates that a respondent has cast a ballot.
To measure attitudinal support for autocracy, we combine regime classification data with
survey responses to measure support for the previous form of autocratic government.
Hypothesis 2 posits that respondents fearing violence are more supportive of the type of
autocratic regime in power before their country experienced a transition to electoral democ-
racy. Creating this measure requires identifying the type of autocratic regime in each country
in our sample and combining this information with respondent’s support for this particular
type of regime. First, we identify each country’s most recent past autocratic regime using the
classification of Geddes et al. (2014). Of the 21 countries in this study, 10 were previously
classified as single party regimes, eight were previously classified as personalist, and one was
previously classified as a military regime.17 Second, depending on the country’s type of auto-
cratic regime, we use Afrobarometer data to code the extent to which a respondent approves
of Single-Party Rule, Personalist Rule, or Military Rule on a five-point scale ranging from 1
(i.e. strongly disapprove) to 5 (i.e. strongly approve). For example, for respondents in
Kenya, a former single-party regime, the measure indicates respondents’ support for single-
party rule. In addition to estimating separate models for each of the three past autocratic
regime types separately, we also combine these measures to capture support for the Past
Autocratic Government across the three types, estimating a pooled model.
In order to facilitate presentation, interpretation, and comparability of our results, we
recode all indices to the 0–1 interval, such that 0 equals the lowest and 1 equals the highest
category. All reported effects are based on our rescaled outcomes.
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Control variables. We control for socio-economic and political characteristics. The set of
socio-economic controls includes the respondent’s Age and Age2, whether a respondent is
Male, and lives in a Rural area, a Poverty Index, as well as Education and Employment
Status fixed effects.
The list of political controls includes a series of partisanship indicators, including whether
an individual prior to the most recent election felt close to a political party of the ruling coali-
tion (Incumbent Partisan) or the opposition (Opposition Partisan), or is Non-Partisan (based
on survey partisanship questions and the African Elections Database). Opposition Partisan
serves as the baseline. We also control for respondents’ Community Membership status and
Community Meeting Attendance, Interest in Public Affairs, and the frequency with which
respondents read the Newspaper, listen to the Radio, or watch TV.
Estimation strategy
To estimate the relationship between Fear of Campaign Violence and the various outcomes at
the individual level, we estimate the following statistical model:
Outcomei ¼ b1Fear of Campaign ViolenceiþgXiþ dþ aþ ei
where the subscript i stands for individual, b1 is our parameter of interest, gXi denotes the
set of individual controls, d stands for survey round fixed effects, a stands for country fixed
effects, and ei is the idiosyncratic error. The model is estimated using ordinary least squares
(OLS), which are as good as nonlinear models at estimating marginal effects (Angrist and
Pischke, 2008; Beck, 2015) and, importantly, allow us to include country fixed effects to con-
trol for time-invariant country-specific factors without risking incidental variable bias and
sacrificing sample size and interpretability of coefficient estimates. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the village level to account for the dependency of individuals within villages.18
Our empirical identification strategy relies on the inclusion of survey round and country
fixed effects and a rich set of controls. Hence, our estimates derive from averaging across
individuals who differ in their fear of campaign violence within survey rounds and countries,
conditional on socio-economic and political controls.
Results
We present our main results graphically; regression tables are available in Online Appendix
B. We begin by discussing the effect of fear on attitudinal support for democracy.
Does fear of campaign violence lower support for democracy?
Figure 1 presents the coefficient estimates and their 95% confidence intervals of fears of vio-
lence for three different sets of control variables on our four democratic attitudinal outcomes
and turnout. The dashed line indicates 0.
Figure 1 shows that fear of campaign violence has a consistent and statistically significant
negative association with all democratic attitudinal outcomes, independent of the set of con-
trols included in the statistical model. This suggests that fear of pre-electoral violence is con-
sistently negatively correlated with measures of attitudinal support for democracy.
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These effects are substantively meaningful. Compared with an individual who does not
fear campaign violence at all, an otherwise similar person fearing pre-electoral victimization
a lot is 5.4% (4.8%; 6%)19 less likely to prefer democracy over all other forms of govern-
ment, which is equivalent to a 13% shift in the outcome’s standard deviation. The identical
cross-individual comparison results in a decrease of 0.066 (0.063; 0.069) points on the index
of perceived democratic extent and a decrease of 0.057 (0.054; 0.060) points on the satisfac-
tion with democracy index, which roughly equals a quarter of a point on either index or
almost a 23% shift in either outcomes’ standard deviation. Finally, the same comparison
suggests a decrease of 0.039 (0.036; 0.042) points on the trust index in political institutions,
which roughly equals a quarter of a point on the index or a 12% change in terms of the out-
come’s standard deviation.
While our argument suggests that the reduced support for democracy is due to fears of
electoral competition, it is unclear to what extent the attitudinal change is limited to electoral
features of democracy. We perform an exploratory analysis on its impact on support for var-
ious specific institutional features of democracy. Existing theory does not provide much gui-
dance on whether fear should affect support for the electoral dimensions of democracy or
undermine support for democracy more broadly, but this is a question of great policy impor-
tance. If fear undermines support for electoral features of democracy, such as support for
elections and multiparty competition, the consequences—while still worrisome—may be lim-
ited. If the effect of fearing campaign violence extends to non-electoral features of democ-
racy, such as accountability of the government to parliament or accountability of the
Figure 1. Effect of fear of campaign violence on attitudinal and behavioral support for democracy.
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president to the rule of law, the consequences of fearing election violence are even more con-
cerning. The Afrobarometer survey asks respondents about their support for eight distinct
institutional features of democracy: Elections, Multiple Parties, Rule of Law, Parliamentary
Accountability, Parliamentary Primacy, Opposition Criticism, Media Criticism, and presiden-
tial Term Limits. Support is measured by the degree to which respondents support leadership
selection through elections, the presence of multiple political parties, parliamentary account-
ability, the criticism of government through opposition parties and the media, parliamentary
primacy in policy making, presidential respect for law and courts, and the constitutional lim-
itation of presidential terms. The exact wording of questions is in Online Appendix Table
A.II. Responses are coded on a six-point scale, ranging from 0 (i.e. very strongly disagree) to
5 (i.e. very strongly agree). As with all other outcome measures we have recoded it to range
between 0 and 1.
Figure 2 shows the coefficient estimates and their 95% confidence intervals of fearing
campaign violence for three different sets of control variables on eight different institutional
elements of democracy. The dashed line indicates 0.
The results suggest that fear of election violence does not result in a wholesale rejection of
democracy. Fearing violence is not significantly associated with support for elections or par-
liamentary accountability of the government, but with support for multiple political parties,
which respondents might plausibly link to election violence. There is also a negative correla-
tion with support for the rule of law, which is more puzzling and possibly related to perceived
and/or actual corruption of law enforcement and the judiciary. However, there is also a posi-
tive association with support for opposition and media scrutiny, parliamentary primacy, and
term limits, suggesting support for some sort of government accountability. Overall, these
results suggest that fear of campaign violence is not consistently linked to all institutional fea-
tures of democracy. Lower levels of support for and satisfaction with democracy overall
should not be equated with a wholesale rejection of democratic governance. We proceed to
examining the effect of fear on support for non-democracy.
Does fear of campaign violence raise support for the past autocratic form of
government?
Figure 3 presents the coefficient estimates and 95% confidence intervals of pre-electoral vio-
lence for three different sets of control variables on support for the past autocratic form of
government. The top row presents the results from the subsamples of countries that used to
have single-party or personalist rule and the bottom row presents the result of countries with
previous military rule and then for all 21 countries, combining the subsamples. The dashed
line indicates 0.
The results indicate that fear of campaign violence is significantly associated with
increased support for a country’s past form of autocratic government. A citizen very fearful
of campaign violence is on average 0.021 (0.018; 0.024) points more supportive of autocracy,
which is about a tenth of a point change on the autocratic government support index or
roughly a 7% change on the outcome’s standard deviation. The magnitude of this correla-
tion is fairly stable across regime-specific outcomes, be it a single-party, personalist, or mili-
tary rule.20 In substantive terms, the association is much smaller than the democratic
attitude affect sizes: they are only between half and one-third in size. This suggests that

























































von Borzyskowski et al. 11
disaffection with democracy does not translate in a one-to-one fashion into support for past
autocratic government forms.
An important question for policy is where in society this support for a return to autocratic
forms of government comes from. In particular, does fear of election violence trigger feelings
of nostalgia among the elderly or a desire for governmental change among younger citizens?
Although our theoretical framework does not offer any guidance in this respect, we investi-
gate in an exploratory analysis whether this positive association varies significantly across
age groups. We group respondents into three age categories: those younger than 30, those
between 30 and 50, and those older than 50 years of age. The idea behind this categorization
is that most countries in the sample transitioned to democracy in the 1990s. Thus, respon-
dents older than 50 at the time of the interview have first-hand experience of life under auto-
cracy whereas respondents younger than 30 have only experienced electoral democracy. We
then interact each category with our measure of fearing campaign violence and re-run the
three models depicted in the lower right panel of Figure 3. The baseline category is the oldest
group of people (i.e. those older than 50 years). The results are presented in Table 1.
Figure 3. Effect of fear of campaign violence on support for autocratic government forms.
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The regression table provides two interesting insights. First, age seems to be negatively
correlated with support for a return to the previous autocratic form of government. The old-
est cohort is least and the youngest cohort most likely to support a return to autocracy.
On average respondents younger than 30 years are 0.016 (0.011; 0.021) points more likely
to support a return to autocracy, which is equivalent to a 5.5% change in the outcome’s stan-
dard deviation. Substantively, the age association is pretty small, but does point toward one
potential basis of support for the return to autocracy.
Second, fear of campaign violence does not seem to be differentially correlated with auto-
cratic support across age groups. The coefficient estimates of the two interaction terms of the
fear of campaign violence and age cohorts are small and statistically insignificant. We now
turn to behavioral effects by examining how fearing campaign violence influences turnout.
Does fear of campaign violence lower turnout?
Results for turnout are shown in the fifth panel in Figure 1. Our estimations suggest that citi-
zens fearing campaign violence a lot are on average 1.8% (1.2%; 2.4%) less likely to turn out
than fearless citizens. This is equivalent to roughly a 4% change in terms of the outcome’s
standard deviation in turnout, which is lower than most attitudinal correlations discussed
above. There are two reasons we can think of for why the effect is smaller than on attitudes:
first, because attitudes may be easier to change than behavior; and second, because violence
can have a mobilizing effect on turnout in some (albeit rare cases), as mentioned in our theo-
retical section. Although case studies (e.g. Bratton, 2008; Laakso, 2007) suggest that electoral
violence in Sub-Saharan Africa is more often used to lower turnout of certain groups, our
measure of fearing campaign violence is broader in scope so that it might also capture related
Table I. Support for past autocratic government by age group.
(1) (2) (3)
Support for past autocratic government
(mean = 0.20, SD = 0.29)
Fear of Campaign Violence 0.007** 0.006** 0.007**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Age <30 0.001 0.020*** 0.016***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
30 \ Age < 50 –0.003 0.008* 0.007*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)




Fear of Campaign Violence 3
30 \ Age < 50
0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Socio-economic Controls No Yes Yes
Political Controls No No Yes
R2 0.044 0.063 0.068
Observations 49,422 49,422 49,422
Clusters 8870 8870 8870
Notes: All regressions include country and round fixed effects. Columns 2 and 3 include individual-level socio-economic
controls and Column 3 also includes individual-level political controls. Estimates significant at the 0.05 (0.1, 0.01) level
are marked with ** (*, ***). Standard errors are clustered at the village level.
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behavior, such as threats intended to compel targets to turn out and cast their vote for a spe-
cific candidate or party rather than abstain.
To further investigate our findings on turnout, we examine whether intuitions on partisan
targeting in prior work are supported. For these analyses, we interact fear with partisanship.
The results are shown in Online Appendix Table C.IX and graphically depicted in Online
Appendix Figure C.IV. The constituent term for the fear measure is negative and weakly sig-
nificant in models 1 and 3. The interaction term—indicating the differential effect of fear for
incumbent partisans—is negative and significant in models 1 and 2, and insignificant in
model 3. Appendix Figure C.IV shows that fearing campaign violence affects incumbents’
and non-incumbents’ turnout alike, meaning that it has no differential effect on incumbents.
It also shows that incumbent supporters who fear campaign violence a bit or somewhat are
less likely to turn out than fearless incumbent supporters.
Robustness
We assess the robustness of our main results in three main ways. We start by assessing the
sensitivity of our results owing to omitted variables and our choice of functional form.
Thereafter, we implement a placebo test, allowing us to assess the degree to which our find-
ings depend on the election specific nature of the fear. Finally, we address concerns regard-
ing the basis of respondents’ fear of election violence, showing that citizens’ fear of violence
is robustly associated with exposure to election violence.
Sensitivity analysis
Despite controlling for all time-invariant country differences and a rich set of individual con-
trols accounting for most potential confounders suggested in the existing literature, we can-
not rule out that the reported associations are spurious, i.e. that there are omitted variables
correlated with both our independent and dependent variables that might account for the sig-
nificant associations reported above. We apply Oster’s (2019) coefficient stability test to get a
sense of the likelihood that our results are due to selection on unobservables. Estimation
details and results are noted in Online Appendix Table C.I. The identified sets reported in
Online Appendix Table C.I are quite narrow and none include 0, suggesting that our results
are quite robust to omitted variable bias. In fact, for all of our main outcomes ~d . 1, indicat-
ing that selection on unobservables would have to be larger (and in most cases substantially
larger) than selection on observables, on average selection on unobservables would have to
be almost 11 times the observable selection effect (median ~d = 5.54).
To further assess the robustness of our results to subnational contextual factors, we repli-
cate our main analyses using districts rather than country fixed effects. Districts might be a
more appropriate spatial control, as they are more closely related to electoral units and
important units for the administration of public goods, such as education and health ser-
vices. By using districts fixed effects we hold constant all district-specific time-invariant dif-
ferences across individuals, such as geography and local culture, general quality of public
service provision, type of local political representation, and to some extent persistent local
electoral differences. The results are shown in Online Appendix Table C.II. The coefficient
estimates remain qualitatively unchanged and change little in quantitative terms.
Another concern relates to common support, i.e. the extent to which we have enough
individuals with similar values on socio-economic and political controls in each country that
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differ with regard to fear of campaign violence. If common support is lacking, then our find-
ings might be driven by outliers or depend on our choice of regressions functional form. To
ensure common support we use coarsened exact matching (Diamond and Sekhon, 2013;
King and Nielsen, 2019). Coarsened exact matching matches on variable ranges/strata and
is thus better at reducing imbalance than other matching options such as propensity score
matching (King and Nielsen, 2019). We match on all of our 12 socio-economic and political
covariates plus the country and round. This generates a pruned dataset and weights for each
observation that is retained. Diagnostics show that this procedure achieves high balance.21
Using the matched dataset, we then replicate our main models. The results are shown in
Online Appendix Table C.III. The coefficients remain qualitatively similar and mostly statis-
tically significant.22 This suggests that our results are not driven by outliers or our choice of
functional form.
Next, we examine if our results are driven by a few countries, i.e. we assess heterogeneity
across countries. First, we check for heterogeneity in estimated results. We replicate the main
analyses with controls, but estimate them for each country separately. Results in Online
Appendix Figure C.I indicate that many or all countries support each outcome variable; they
are not driven by a small handful of countries. For satisfaction with democracy, 100% of
countries’ estimated coefficients on fear are negative and 90% are negative and significant.
For extent of democracy and trust in political institutions, 95% of estimated coefficients on
fear are negative (and 81 and 57% are negative and significant, respectively). For preference
for democracy, 86% of countries’ estimated coefficients on fear are negative (and 57% sig-
nificant). Only the turnout estimates have somewhat weaker support, with 76% of countries’
estimated coefficients on fear negative (and 33% significant). This is consistent with weaker
support for turnout in other specifications. Some countries (Mauritania, Nigeria) have larger
coefficients, but results are robust for a large number of countries across outcomes. Second,
we check heterogeneity in fear. As illustrated in Online Appendix Figure C.II, fear varies
widely, from 14 to 68%. Interestingly, the countries noted above are on the lower end of that
distribution; that is, results are not driven by countries with particularly high levels of fear.
Finally, we address social desirability concerns in three ways. First, respondents who
believe that the government conducts the survey may report less campaign violence fear and
more democratic satisfaction (a negative relationship, as we find above). By controlling for
the perceived survey sponsor in the regression, we seek to account for potential misreporting
which is an alternative explanation for the same empirical finding. Specifically, we include a
binary measure indicating whether respondents thought the government sent the interviewer
to conduct the survey (1) rather than some other actor or agency (0). The results are pro-
vided in Online Appendix Table C.IV. As expected, respondents believing that the govern-
ment conducts the survey report higher extent of and satisfaction with democracy, higher
institutional trust, and higher turnout. Including this control does not affect the size of the
estimates for democratic attitudes and behavior; the main effect estimates remain negative
and statistically significant. Second, respondents may respond to fear differently if they
believe that the government is conducting the survey. To check this possibility, we replicate
the main analyses by interacting perceived survey sponsor with fear of campaign violence.
The results in Appendix Table C.V show that only three of 15 interactions are significant,
which are those in the models predicting satisfaction with democracy. They are only weakly
significant (two at the 90% confidence level) and the estimated coefficients on the interaction
are small. We conclude from these analyses that social desirability may be a partial explana-
tion behind the satisfaction results but not the other four outcomes. Third, respondents who
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fear violence may be less likely to answer questions about democracy and turnout. To assess
this, we construct a dependent binary variable Answer, coded 1 when respondents answered
all of these questions about our five main outcomes variables and 0 if respondents did not
answer one or more of these questions. We run binary and multivariate regressions (with all
controls). Results in Online Appendix Table C.VI indicate that fearing campaign violence
does not change the probability of answering survey questions related to democracy and
turnout.
Placebo regressions
Our argument relies on the election-specific nature of fearing violence. We assume that
respondents can distinguish between different types of fear and update their attitudes and
behavior according to their different causes and associations, i.e. who commits the violence,
when, where, and to what effect. Election violence is usually organized by political conten-
ders around election time, especially in contested areas. In contrast, other types of violence
such as street crime are not usually committed by politicians, are not seasonal around elec-
tions, and do not usually vary with local partisanship. We contend that people are aware of
the source of their suffering. Citizens should link election violence to elections and political
competition, while they should attribute street crime to poverty and inequality. If this rea-
soning is correct, then fear of crime should have a much weaker association with attitudinal
and behavioral support for democracy. It may have effects on satisfaction with the incum-
bent government for (not) improving poverty levels, but fear of crime should not influence
satisfaction with regime types. To assess the extent to which our main results might be dri-
ven by non-election-specific fear, we replace Fear of Campaign Violence with Fear of Crime.
Fear of Crime is measured by the answer to the survey question: ‘‘Over the past year, how
often, if ever, have you or any in your family feared crime in your own home?’’ Answers are
coded on a five-point scale ranging from ‘‘never’’ (0) to ‘‘always’’ (4). We re-scale this pla-
cebo variable to the 0–3 range to ease comparability with our main independent variable.
The results of these placebo regression are presented in Online Appendix Table C.VII.
Fear of crime is not significantly associated with support for any form of autocratic govern-
ment and unrelated to citizens’ preference for democracy. It is negatively associated with
turnout and other attitudinal measures of democracy, but the effect size is smaller for all
those four outcomes. Overall, the consistency in the main results and larger effect size com-
pared with the placebo results suggests that our main results are in fact due to an election-
specific fear of victimization rather than some general reaction to fear of violence.
Validating fear of campaign violence
Our empirical results support the argument that fear of campaign violence has detrimental
effects on attitudes and democratic behavior. As we discuss in our theoretical section, we
examine fear as one of several psychological responses to actual exposure to violence.
However, we do expect that fear is a common response to violence and therefore anticipate
that fear correlates with exposure to actual election violence. We empirically examine
whether events of violence on the ground are linked to greater fear of violence in two sepa-
rate robustness tests. For both tests, we use event data on election violence from the
Electoral Contention and Violence (ECAV) data (Daxecker et al., 2019) and correlate them
with citizens’ fear of violence from Afrobarometer, making sure that exposure precedes the
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measurement of citizens’ fears. We measure exposure to violence based on second-order
administrative units, or districts. Districts as subnational administrative units are small
enough that it is plausible to expect that respondents experienced or heard about incidents
of violence. To establish these correlations, we identify the election preceding Afrobarometer
rounds 4 and 5 in each country in our sample and examine reported violence in this elec-
tion.23 It seems reasonable to expect that citizens asked about fear of campaign violence
would draw on their experiences in the most recent elections held in their country. For both
robustness tests, we spatially join data using respondents’ coordinates from the
Afrobarometer surveys with geocoded event data from ECAV in Arcmap.24 For the spatial
join, we only include events and respondents whose location is recorded at the level of the
district or more precisely.
The first robustness test simply correlates district-level fear of violence and actual election
violence by counting the number of ECAV events preceding the survey and the number of
Afrobarometer respondents fearing violence in each district. Online Appendix Figure C.III
presents a scatterplot of both variables. The correlation between actual violent events and
fear of violence is positive (corr = 0.49, p \ 0.05), confirming that districts with more vio-
lent events also have more respondents fearing violence.
The second robustness test inferentially assesses whether citizens in the proximity of vio-
lence report being more fearful. Having identified respondents exposed to election violence
in their districts before each round in the spatial join described above, we merge this variable
into our main dataset. This variable is a dummy coded 1 for respondents who were exposed
to election violence in their district, and 0 otherwise. We then estimate whether those exposed
are more fearful of campaign violence. Results are presented in Online Appendix Table
C.VIII Panel A. The coefficients for the exposure variable are positive and significant in all
models, showing that those in the proximity of violence are more fearful. We next examine
whether this effect is subject to partisan dynamics. We would expect that opposition parti-
sans and non-partisans have a stronger response to exposure to violence because they should
be more at risk of being targeted with violence happening in their district (von Borzyskowski
and Kuhn, 2020; Rauschenbach and Paula, 2019). Conversely, incumbent partisans should
be less likely to become fearful. We therefore interact the exposure to events dummy variable
with a variable identifying incumbent partisans. We expect that the effect of exposure is
weaker for incumbent partisans compared with opposition voters or non-partisans. Online
Appendix Table C.VIII Panel B shows support for this expectation. The coefficient for the
exposure variable indicates the effect for opposition partisans and non-partisans and it is
positive and statistically significant. Incumbent partisans are generally less fearful than oppo-
sition and non-partisans, but those living in districts with recorded election violence events
are even less fearful, which is consistent with previous research indicating that in Sub-
Saharan Africa incumbents are the main perpetrator targeting opposition and non-partisans
(von Borzyskowski and Kuhn, 2020; Rauschenbach and Paula, 2019; Straus and Taylor,
2012).
In sum, while our research design does not allow for a causal interpretation of the coeffi-
cient estimates, it does in conjunction with the checks above indicate that our reported esti-
mates represent robust associations to a variety of alternative specifications and confirm that
they are the result of election-specific fear of violence.
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Conclusion
How does fear of election violence influence political attitudes and participation? Research
on election violence has largely focused on its causes, paying less attention to its conse-
quences. This scarcity of knowledge is surprising because election violence plays a key role
in both the democratization and the political violence literature, and because electoral vio-
lence has potentially important implications for democratic survival, breakdown, and regime
transitions. To shed light on these issues, we examine the consequences of fearing election
violence on citizens’ attitudes toward democracy and autocracy as well as their political par-
ticipation. First, does fear of violence weaken support for democracy and participation in
democratic politics? And if so, does it lead to a blanket rejection of democracy generally or
does it only undermine specific institutional features of democracy? Second, does fearing
election violence also change support for autocratic regimes? And if so, why?
Building on insights from political psychology, we argue that fear of campaign violence
undermines support for democracy and increases support for returning to the previous auto-
cratic form of government. Compared with non-anxious people, anxious people are more
motivated to re-consider and change their attitudes and behavior. When citizens come to
associate elections with the threat and use of force, it diminishes their support for electoral
competition and democracy more broadly. Moreover, this dwindling support for democracy
translates into increased support for autocratic forms of government.
Our empirical analyses provide support for this argument. We use individual-level survey
data for 21 electoral democracies in Africa and document that fearing campaign violence is
associated with lower popular support for democracy and higher support for returning to
autocracy. More specifically, our results suggest that fearing electoral violence is detrimental
to an individual’s preference for and satisfaction with democracy, an individual’s perception
of the extent of democracy in the country and an individual’s trust in political institutions
and electoral participation. Further, we find that the detrimental effects of election violence
are not limited to directly related features of democracy (such as multiparty competition)
but also extend to unrelated features of democracies, such as parliamentary primacy and rule
of law. This is worrisome, as it suggests that election violence can make individuals reject
democracy more broadly rather than just those features of democracy directly linked to elec-
tion violence. Further, our finding that individuals fearing violence are less likely to turn out
is in line with many previous single-country studies but different from the two previous
cross-national analyses on this issue (Burchard, 2015, 2020). These findings should provide
further impetus for reducing electoral violence and intimidation (Birch and Muchlinski,
2018).
Finally, our analysis suggests that fearing election violence is associated with a boost in
support for autocracy. Individuals fearing campaign violence are more willing to return to
the previous autocratic regime in their country, be it single-party or personalist rule. Hence,
results are consistent with the argument that election violence can make citizens become dis-
illusioned with democracy and support autocracy.
Our findings have important implications for research on democratic consolidation, which
seems to have an important blindspot. While focused on the role of institutions and account-
ability, election violence has so far been neglected as an important correlate of democratic
breakdown. Citizens fearful of violence are less supportive of democracy, which can hinder
democratic deepening and in fact reverse democratic gains from the past. From the perspec-
tive of incumbents—who are the major perpetrators—using election violence in political
18 Conflict Management and Peace Science 00(0)
competition seems to generate a double win: it can help increase their chances of winning in
this election and also increase public support for power concentration in the executive by
instilling fear in citizens. It is little surprise, then, that electoral violence has become a rather
frequent feature of elections in developing countries.
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Notes
1. For example, the 2020 V-DEM report shows that seven Sub-Saharan African countries experi-
enced significant declines in democracy (V-DEM, 2020: 15).
2. Calculation based on Afrobarometer data described below.
3. In line with the literature on political behavior, we use behavior to refer to self-reported (rather
than verified) turnout.
4. Election violence is distinct from other organized violence in that the electoral process affects
how and why electoral violence arises, implying that violence would have played out differently
or not occurred at all in the absence of the elections (Birch et al., 2020). Election violence can
occur before, during, and after elections. We focus on fear of pre-election violence here.
5. While emotional responses may be varied, we expect that many citizens do in fact become more
fearful in response to actual violence. In the robustness section, we show a positive correlation
between exposure to campaign violence and fear thereof to support this claim.
6. For a recent review, see Davenport et al. (2019).
7. We also caution that experimental designs randomizing fear of violence come with substantial
ethical concerns and hence are not necessarily preferable to observational research.
8. We also acknowledge that fear might trigger irrational responses in some citizens. Our subsequent
argument follows an instrumental logic.
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9. About 80% of pre-election violence in Sub-Saharan Africa is orchestrated by incumbent politi-
cians (International Crisis Group, 2007: 4; Sachikonye, 2011: 19; Straus and Taylor, 2012: 29–31).
10. While eliminating competitive elections would reduce electoral violence, it is possible that auto-
cratic regimes experience more political violence overall, as pointed out by Harish and Little
(2017). It is difficult to say if fearful citizens prefer the more implicit threat of violence in auto-
cracy compared with explicit violence they experience in elections, but this is an important ques-
tion for future research.
11. In addition, Hypothesis 1 implies that those fearing election violence are either more likely to sup-
port non-democracy or are at least indifferent to it.
12. Summary statistics of all measures are provided in the Online Appendix Section A.I.
13. One potential threat to inference is low survey participation in areas prone to campaign violence.
We use data from our validation exercise on violent events in robustness tests to examine this pos-
sibility. Using data on campaign violence reported in Afrobarometer districts, we check if
Afrobarometer consistently sampled fewer respondents in violent districts compared with non-
violent districts. Our results suggest the opposite, namely that the average number of respondents
is higher in violent districts. We caution, however, that only 9% of respondents live in districts
with violence, and that the greater number of respondents in these locations could stem from
sampling more respondents in urban areas, where violence may be better reported.
14. Waves 4–6 of the Afrobarometer survey were collected between March 2008 and June 2009
(round 4), October 2011 and September 2013 (round 5), and March 2014 and November 2015
(round 6). The 21 electoral democracies are Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya (round
6), Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar (rounds 5 and 6), Malawi, Mali, Mauritius (rounds 5 and 6),
Mozambique (round 4), Niger, Namibia, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone (rounds
5 and 6), South Africa, Tanzania (rounds 5 and 6), Tunisia (rounds 5 and 6), and Zambia. Our
sample consists of approximately 55,000 respondents in these 21 countries. This is obviously not a
random sample. Countries tend to be clustered in West, East, and Southern Africa. West Central
Africa is not included, as well as countries inland of the Red Sea. Therefore it is important to keep
in mind that the results reported below apply only to the 21 African countries included in our
sample.
15. Our results do not depend on Freedom House’s definition of electoral democracy. Using the com-
mon cut-point of Polity IVø 6 in 2008 yields virtually the same sample with the exception of
Mozambique, which has a value of 5.
16. The characteristics of those fearing campaign violence align with expectations from the literature on
election violence; those who are (more) fearful are younger, female, opposition partisans, newspaper
readers, community members, and poorer. Results are provided in Online Appendix Table C.X.
17. Two countries (Mauritius and Sao Tome and Principe) have no classification in Geddes et al.
(2014), and are thus excluded from the autocracy analysis.
18. The public version of the Afrobarometer data does not include village/town identifiers to protect
the respondents’ privacy. For a related project we were granted access to identifiers, which we use
here to account for inter-individual dependency within villages.
19. Upper and lower bounds of the 95% confidence interval of the point estimate are provided in
brackets. These substantive effect estimates are based on the coefficient estimates in model 3 (with
full controls), and result from multiplying the coefficient by 3 to calculate the change from ‘‘no
fear’’ (0) to ‘‘fearing a lot’’ (3).
20. The estimate for military rule is somewhat larger but only based on a single country.
21. The multivariate L1 distance score is 0.22, on a range of 0–1 where lower values indicate more
balance.
22. This procedure results in a matched dataset of 128 observations.
23. The two exceptions are extent of democracy and return to autocracy.
24. Data for elections surrounding Afrobarometer round 6 is not included in ECAV. For reporting
on election violence, also see Borzyskowski and Wahman (2021).
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25. Since Afrobarometer does not provide shapefiles for the district variables it records, we rely on
the Global Administrative Data (GADM) to spatially join Afrobarometer respondents with
ECAV events in each district. This means that the districts used for the spatial join could be
slightly different from the district variables recoded in Afrobarometer. A manual inspection
showed that district names in Afrobarometer and GADM are very similar; however, name-based
merges are a poor substitute for our spatial join because of differences in spelling, and we lack
shapefiles for the districts in the Afrobarometer data. GADM data are available at https://gad-
m.org/index.html.
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Söderström J (2018) Fear of electoral violence and its impact on political knowledge in Sub-Saharan
Africa. Political Studies 66(4): 869–4886.
Straus S and Taylor C (2012) Democratization and electoral violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990–
2008. In: Voting in Fear: Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa. United States Institute of Peace,
pp. 15–38.
Svolik MW (2013) Learning to love democracy: Electoral accountability and the success of democracy.
American Journal of Political Science 57(3): 685–702.
Travaglianti M (2014) Threatening your own. Electoral violence within ethnic groups in Burundi and
beyond. Dissertation, New York University.
Valentino N, Brader T, Groenendyk E, Gregorowicz K and Hutchings V (2011) Election night’s alright
for fighting: The role of emotions in political participation. Journal of Politics 73: 156–170.
V-DEM (2020) Autocratization surges—Resistance grows. Varieties of Democracy (V-DEM) Report.
Wilkinson S and Haid CJ (2009) Ethnic violence as campaign expenditure: Riots, competition, and
vote swings in India. Working Paper.
Young LE (2019) The psychology of state repression: Fear and dissent decisions in Zimbabwe.
American Political Science Review 113(1): 140–155.
Young LE (2020) Who dissents? Self-efficacy and opposition action after state-sponsored election
violence. Journal of Peace Research 57(1): 62–76.
Zeitzoff T (2014) Anger, exposure to violence, and intragroup conflict: A ‘‘lab in the field’’ experiment
in southern Israel. Political Psychology 35(3): 309–335.
von Borzyskowski et al. 23
